While I object to some of the conclusions that the court has drawn in this particular case, I am far more concerned with the broader implications of the paragraph starting line 20 of page 24, referring to the the US Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. 2510-22). "First, the court concludes that this statute is not implicated because, as to electronic communications, it only prohibits interceptions during transmission (not while in electronic storage, i.e. RAM), and the disclosure of electronic communications intercepted during transmission. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.302 F.3d 868, 878-879 (9th Cir. 2002). This is true even though storage is a necessary incident to transmission."
This is an explicit writ authorizing anyone
the legal right to record any and all information that passes through the RAM on their computer. I.E. if I own webserver X, I am within my legal right to log all information, or a portion thereof, that passes through my system, by virtue that it will reside, however briefly, in that system's RAM. This includes data for which my server is not the intended recipient, as it has still been electronically stored on my
system. For example, I could record the addresses of all emails that route through my server. And since this recording is my property, my consequent sale of said information to interested third parties is completely legal. This also means that any gov't agency that so desires this information can acquire it via a straightforward civil information discovery request, bypassing the more stringent requirements to obtain a valid wiretap warrant. The implications of this ruling for the future of data protection and security are frightening. While I am confident that it will be overturned or at least limited in the future, the potential for abuse is mind-boggling (like most things